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6 China anxieties in the geopolitical 
cartographies of the lndo-Pacific 
Chengxin Pan 
He who controls the Inda-Pacific controls the future. 
Peter J. Munson (2013) 
Concepts about space and time, such as the Asia-Pacific and the Asian Century, 
are not articulated lightly in international relations discourses. When a spatial or 
temporal term comes into vogue, it often comes with political connotations and 
policy implications. This is the context in which we ought to consider the mak-
ing of the spatial term Inda-Pacific, which has recently made it into the lexicon 
of official speeches, think-tank reports, government white papers and scholarly 
works. While many pundits and practitioners are embracing this new formula-
tion, others cast doubt on its usefulness or even question its actual existence. Yet, 
despite its sudden stardom in foreign policy circles and some debate around its 
policy implications, how the Inda-Pacific as a political spatial concept came about 
has not been well understood. 
To address this gap, this chapter will first briefly survey the Inda-Pacific debate 
and examine how the debate has not paid adequate attention to the issue of the 
/ 
Inda-Pacific as a discursive construct. It then turns to how the United States, Aus-
tralia, Japan, India and China together contribute to the formation of this concept 
amid ongoing geopolitical anxieties about the shape and trajectory of future Asian 
regional order. While acknowledging China's role in this constitutive process, 
I argue that as a discursive construct the Inda-Pacific has been motivated primar-
ily by geopolitical anxieties about a perceived emerging regional order dominated 
by China. Driven by such anxieties, the concept is not an innocent description of 
a natural region out there; it has the potential of fuelling regional rivalries and 
exacerbating security dilemmas. Given its possible destabilising consequences, 
the chapter concludes with a call for a critical reimagination of this now increas-
ingly accepted term. 
The lndo-Pacific debate 
For much of the twentieth century, the concept of the Inda-Pacific, coined by 
German geopolitician Karl Haushofer in the 1920s, had attracted little attention 
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among international relations scholars or practitioners. It was not until the late 
2000s that the term began to make an impressive comeback, and is now widely 
touted as reflecting new geopolitical realities. Indian strategic analyst C. Raja 
Mohan (2012, 212) argues that the seas of the western Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean constitute 'a single integrated geopolitical theater' that is the Indo-Pacific. 
In Australia, Rory Medcalf (2012, 3; see also this volume) believes that the new 
term is 'a valid and objective description of the greater regional system in which 
Australia now finds itself' . Australian Ambassador to the United States Kim Bea-
zley (2012, 52) agrees, maintaining that the Indo-Pacific presents 'a practical, 
strategic reality that has to be addressed' . Crucially, the Australian Defence White 
Paper 2013 (Commonwealth of Australia 2013, 7) for the first time identifies 
Australia's region as the 'Indo-Pacific strategic arc'. 
In the United States, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011, 57) referred 
to the Indo-Pacific as the new Asia-Pacific. If this geogpaphical fact was not clear 
enough before, we are told that it is because its importance had been 'obscured' 
by -recent 'messy land wars' such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now that the 
fog of war has largely lifted, the Indo-Pacific has presented itself with 'a vivid 
geographical face' (Kaplan 2010, xi- xii). Thus Robert Kaplan (2010, xiii, empha-
sis added) suggests that his book Monsoon merely-tf'ies to 'describe the ceaseless 
currents of historical change [in the Greater Indian Ocean region] as they shape 
the contours of the new century' . His invocation of a 'monsoon' seems to remind 
us, among other things, of the region's timeless natural coherence. 
Others remain sceptical of the Indo-Pacific idea, at least with regard to its stra-
tegic repercussions. Retired Rear Admiral Michael McDevitt (2013, 65) suggests 
that it 'would be premature to make too much' of this notion. Some Australian 
scholars argue that the emphasis on the Asian littoral (the ludo-Pacific) ignores 
Asia's vast territorial expanses, or 'horizontal Asia' (Bubalo and Cook 2010). 
Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips (2012) question the strategic wisdom of pro-
moting the Indo-Pacific, given the risk that it may intensify regional competition 
(see also Chacko 2012b; Gnanagurunathan 2012). Similarly, Rumley, Doyle and 
Chaturvedi (2012) point out that the concept is US-centric/China exclusive. Even 
India's former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon (2013) does not 
see the Indo-Pacific as 'one geopolitical unit' . He argues that by invoking this 
concept, we risk 'prescribing one medicine for the different security ailments' 
characteristic of its diverse places. 
I agree that the Indo-Pacific is not a natural geographical space, but rather a 
discursive construct with strategic implications. Even former US Assistant Secre-
tary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell seemed to have unwittingly admitted it 
when he suggested that 'the next challenge' of US strategic thinking was the task 
of operationally making the linkage between the Indian and Pacific Oceans (see 
Manyin et al. 2012, 5). Yet, as Chacko points out in her introduction to this vol-
ume, until now, questions such as how the Indo-Pacific is discursively constructed, 
within what metageographical frameworks, against what types of regional back-
drop, and for what purposes have yet to be more thoroughly examined. The main 
focus of this chapter is on how the Indo-Pacific has been enabled by a suite of 
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geopolitically informed discourses and practices concerning the rise of China in 
the Asian regional order. 
Imagining/doing the lndo-Pacific through geopolitical 
anxieties 
National imaginations and geopolitical anxieties 
The Indo-Pacific as a region does not exist prior to its 'discovery' by astute 
observers; rather, it has been imagined into being by them. I will return to this 
point in a moment, but one thing about imagination is worth noting here. Accord-
ing to David Brin (1989, 67, emphasis in original), imagination is a uniquely 
human talent that 'lets us "know" what has never happened, and even what might 
truly never happen!' Therefore by definition there is always a gap between what 
is imagined and what is putatively real, a gap which renders the imagined object 
both psychologically exciting and ontologically insecure. In this sense, anxiety, 
fear and fantasy tend to go hand in hand with such imaginative practices. 
To illustrate, one need only look at the imagined community of the nation-state. 
Despite its seemingly organic status, the state from the beginning suffers chronic 
anxiety about its precarious ontological being, hence the incessant concern with 
national identity, survival, security, sovereignty, living space, territorial integrity, 
border control, 'access', foreign threats, regional order, and power balance. As 
Europe was the birthplace of the nation-state, it is not surprising that it was there 
that classical geopolitics, the dominant metageographical framework about the 
world, was first developed as a 'science' to help account for and manage national-
ist anxieties about how to survive in an 'anarchical' inter-state system. In popu-
lar culture, copious invasion novels testify to the prevalence of such geopolitical 
anxieties in the public imagination. 
Geopolitical anxieties are often associated with and managed through a raft 
of practices of spatial security: war, territorial annexation, expansion, alliance-
formation, military build-up, arms race, missile defence, military exercises, for-
ward defence, strategic talks and so forth. As a result of such practices and their 
international interactions, boundaries of a region may be invented, redrawn or rein-
terpreted with new meanings. To better understand how the lndo-Pacific has come 
about, I now tum to the specific geopolitical anxieties and imaginations in the 
United States, Australia, Japan, India and China, and examine how their imagina-
tive geographies and associated security practices together help construct this new 
geopolitical space. My focus on these countries, I should add, does not imply that 
these countries are the only players in the imaginative and constitutive processes. 
American geopolitical imaginations of China's rise 
To understand the discursive production of the Indo-Pacific, we need to exam-
ine American geopolitical imaginations about the world in general and the rise 
of China in particular. As the 'imagined community par excellence' (Campbell 
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1998, 91, 132), geopolitics has been central to the US self-imagination. US secu-
rity and survival, for instance, is often predicated on various spatial practices of 
geopolitics, with ever-expanding frontiers seen as crucial for its self-renewal as 
the exceptional and indispensable nation. Dean Acheson (1950) once asserted that 
Americans 'are children of freedom' and 'cannot be safe except in an environment 
of freedom'. Thus to create and maintain this living space for freedom, the Ameri-
can value of freedom has to be communicated to the four comers of the earth. 
This belief reflects what Hardt and Negri (2000, 165) call America's imperial 
sovereignty, with 'its tendencY- toward an open, expansive project operating on an 
unbounded terrain'. Thus, moving beyond the Monroe Doctrine, the new imperial 
imagination of the United States, combining both geopolitics and a certain New 
World idealism, urged Americans to seek new frontiers in the Pacific and Asia. In 
this context, it is easy to understand a long-standing strategic article of faith in US 
foreign policy that the United States ought to 'dominate the western hemisphere 
while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia' 
(Mearsheimer 2001 a, 46).. Only through such an expansive geopolitical strategy 
can the United States ensure its security. 
While pursuing this strategy may help ease particular geopolitical anxieties 
facing the United States, the geopolitical mind~~at underpins the strategy is in 
a constant state of anxiety. It often looks at the behaviour of other powers through 
the same strategic prism, fearful that what the United States has done is what its 
peer competitors will do. After the collapse of the Soviet Unioq,,_ the United States 
increasingly sees its own mirror-images of imperial expansion in the rise of China 
(Pan 2004, 2012a). With its vast landmass and fast-growing economy, China is 
seen as a natural candidate to dominate Asia and uproot US primacy in the region. 
Drawing from the same logic that explains the US expansion and ascendancy in 
the past, many American observers perceive China's rise in Asia as following 
an essentially similar geopolitical trajectory. As John Mearsheimer (2001 b, 401) 
argues, like the rise of the United States in the nineteenth century, a rising China 
'would surely pursue regional hegemony' with its own Monroe Doctrine. It is 
predicted that this Chinese Monroe Doctrine would 'push U.S. forces out of the 
Asia-Pacific region' (Walt 2012) and lead to 'the loss of the Indian and_ Western 
Pacific oceans as veritable American military lakes' (Kaplan 2009, 45). As the 
imaginative catchphrase of 'Red Star over the Pacific' implies, the days of US 
control of the vast ocean seem to be numbered (Yoshihara and Holmes 2010). 
Washington's heightened concerns over its freedom of navigation in the South 
China Sea and China's 'anti-access, area denial' (A2/AD) capabilities epitomise 
this anxiety. Indeed, 'access denial has become the prism through which poli-
cymakers in Washington survey the rise of Chinese sea power' (Yoshihara and 
Holmes 2010, 6). 
American anxieties about China's rise are not just about its economic and mili-
tary power per se (Zhang 2013). Increasingly the 'China threat' is seen in the 
context of this so-called Middle Kingdom's growing regional ambition. In other 
words, underneath the traditional bilateral rivalry between Washington and Bei-
jing is believed to be a larger struggle of competing regionalisms (Zhu 2013), 
China anxieties in the 'Indo-Pacific' 101 
a struggle in which China appears to be gaining an upper hand. After the Asian 
:financial crisis, China emerged as a 'responsible economic actor' in the region 
(Breslin 2008). In contrast to George W. Bush's 'shock and awe' unilateralism 
and his administration's preoccupation with the War on Terror in the Middle East, 
Beijing's subsequent 'charm offensive' in Southeast Asia and elsewhere seemed 
to have won itself many friends - so much so that it was widely believed that a 
Sinocentric East Asian order was on the horizon (Beeson 2009). 
Thus even at the height of the US War on Terror, the neoconservative Francis 
Fukuyama (2005, A18) urged the United States not to forget that 'the biggest geo-
political development of this generation' was the rise of China. Meanwhile, then 
US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005) made it clear that China's 
rise had generated 'a cauldron of anxiety' in the United States and elsewhere. 
Although Barack Obama distanced himself from his predecessor on many policy 
fronts, he seemed to have adopted a Bush-style, neoconservative vision of friends 
and foes, and democracies and autocracies in dealing with China (Kagan 2010). 
Through this lens, the increasing regional clout of an assertive authoritarian China 
took on a doubly sinister quality, exacerbating America's fear of losing the 'con-
test over defining an Asian regional identity' (Buzan 2012, 2-3). It is in this con-
text that we can better understand Obama's tour of Asian democracies in 2010, 
the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) framework (which excludes China) as 
well as the rising popularity of the Indo-Pacific concept. 
The Indo-Pacific construct offers a rationale for the Pentagon's AirSea Battle 
plan as well as recent US strategic deployment and realignment in this vast region, 
sometimes known as its 'pivot to Asia' (Medcalf, Heinrichs and Jones 2011, 
19-20; O'Hanlon 2012; White 2012, 76-77). It serves a dual purpose of both con-
straining the rise of a 'peer competitor' in Asia and preventing regional integration 
from being 'inward looking and exclusive' (Quoted in Ciorciari 2011, 146). The 
second purpose reflects another US geopolitical imperative, which has been bril-
liantly summed up by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Imperial geostrategy, as he puts it, 
needs 'to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, 
to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming 
together' (Quoted in Beeson 2009, 507). In this sense, the US motive behind the 
Indo-Pacific becomes clearer. It seems that there is no better way of keeping the 
barbarians separate than designing a super-region like the Indo-Pacific to allow 
the United States to legitimately claim 'we are here to stay', all the while thwart-
ing the emergence of indigenous regional groupings (Buzan 2012). 
This is how the Indian Ocean was brought to the fore. Another 'American lake', 
the Indian Ocean region appears to have become more fluid with the rise of India 
and the spectre of India-China rivalry, or worse, cooperation. For example, dur-
ing Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in 2005, his Indian counterpart 
Manmohan Singh posited that 'together, India and China could reshape the world 
order' (Quoted in Prestwitz 2005). But such a pledge to work together is hardly 
music to the ears of US strategists. Invoking the vicious imagery of monsoon, 
Kaplan, whose writings have done much to educate US officials about the Greater 
Indian Ocean (Green and Shearer 2012, 175), promptly warned that the dawn of 
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the Indo-Pacific era could not have come at 'a more turbulent time' . Crowded with 
'highly volatile and populous pivot states', the region is characterised by 'weak 
institutions, tottering infrastructures, and young and restive populations tempted 
by extremism. Yet they are the future' (Kaplan 2010, xii; see also Munson 2013). 
To Kaplan (2010, xiv) and others, 'America's own destiny and that of the West 
as a whole' are on the line in these troubled waters. Yet by the same token, these 
menacing imageries also open up strategic opportunities for the United States to 
'pivot' to this part of the world and enlist India as a 'desirable' partner (Blank 2007, 1 ). 
To US defence contractors, India's estimated $80 billion military modernisation 
program by 2015 no doubt adds another dimension to New Delhi's desirability 
(Berteau and Green 2012, 3 8). With more than sixty joint military exercises with 
the Pentagon in the past decade, India has conducted more exercises with the 
United States than with any other country (Berteau and Green 2012). Despite the 
US role in initiating those operations (Gilboy and H~ginbotham 2013, 125-126), 
Clinton (2011, 58) insisted that it was the region that 'is eager for our leadership 
and our business' . In any case, as McDevitt (2013, 8) points out, it was India's 
emergence as a strategic partner and the strengthening of US-India security ties 
that 'led U.S. government policy officials to begin thinking about the intercon-
nectedness of the Pacific and Indian oceans', nQ.t the other way around. Also, by 
insisting on 'old-fashioned alliance management' (i.e. the 'hub-and-spoke' sys-
tem) instead of new regional multilateral initiatives (Green and Shearer 2012, 
187), the elite conception of the Indo-Pacific 'fits with a longstanding and very 
clever antiregional diplomatic tactic of the US' (Buzan 2012). 
Australia and Japan: Asia~ 'odd men out' are in 
If this new regional concept comes with a paradoxically anti-regional flavour, it 
begs the question of why regional powers like Australia and Japan are attracted 
to it. In fact, as the chapters in this volume by Medcalf and Jain and Harimoto 
show, both countries have been strong advocates for iterations of this concept. 
The reason, I suggest, also has to do with the geopolitical imaginations in which 
Australia and Japan position themselves vis-a-vis a rising China. Australia has a 
split identity between its history and its geography. As its economic prosperity is 
increasingly linked to Asia and particularly China, Australia has been anxious to 
become part of the action and capitalise on the Asian Century opportunity, and to 
that end it needs to cast off its 'odd man out' status in Asian regionalism (Beeson 
and Yoshimatsu 2007). This partly explains why Canberra wanted to join the East 
Asia Summit (EAS ), to 'have a say in building any new regional architecture from 
the ground up' (Richardson 2005, 360). Another case in point is Australia's deci-
sion, although not before much dithering, to sign up to the China-led Asian Infra-
structure Investment Bank (AIIB). But once getting inside, Australia was troubled 
by another type of anxiety: the danger of dominance by and dependence on China. 
Indeed, as former Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott admitted to German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel, fear is one of the key drivers of Australia's policy on 
China (Gamaut 2015). Long imagining itself as a Western colonial outpost in the 
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East, Australia on its own has rarely felt naturally at home, much less safe, within 
Asia, despite Paul Keating's famous catchphrase that 'Australia should find its 
security in Asia', not 'from Asia'. As former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd rea-
soned, the overshadowing of US and British dominance by looming Chinese and 
Indian ascendancy would leave Australia vulnerable to a 'much more complex 
region'. To ease such anxiety Canberra predictably sought to strengthen its US 
alliance, hence Rudd's 'Asia-Pacific Community' proposal designed to bring in 
the United States to keep China in check (Pan 2012b, 249). 
While the Asia-Pacific Community proposal never got off the ground, the seem-
ingly unrelenting rise of China (and India) created the ever-aching longing for US 
strategic reassurance, a desire that has a great chance of fulfilment in the Indo-
Pacific idea. Among other things, this regional design seems able to allay Aus-
tralia's dual anxiety of being an odd man out and an odd man in, for this expanded 
region not only places Australia 'at the centre of the action' (Taylor 2013) but 
also allows the inclusion of two powerful democratic friends (the United States 
and India) to buttress its hedging strategy towards China. No wonder that many 
Australians now feel that the Indo-Paci:fic 'makes more sense' and 'want to talk 
about' it (Varghese 2012, 2; quoted in Scott 2013b, 4, emphasis added). It sounds 
like a desire fulfilled, with anxiety kept under control. 
Canberra's moment of being at the geopolitical centre of action well and truly 
arrived in November 2011 when Obama chose the venue of the Australian Parlia-
ment to declare the US pivot to Asia. During the same visit, the two allies announced 
the rotational deployment of 2,500 US Marines in Darwin. In 2012, a Pentagon-
commissioned report expressed strong US interest in using Australian facilities at 
the Cocos Islands in the Indian Ocean and the Stirling naval base near Perth for US 
surveillance operations and increased US Navy access (Berteau and Green 2012, 
33). The report made no secret that an added advantage of choosing Stirling is that 
it remains beyond 'the growing coverage of Chinese A2AD capabilities' (Berteau 
and Green 2012, 33). Perhaps not coincidentally, in the 2012 Australian Defence 
Force Posture Review and the 2013 Australian Defence White Paper, upgrading 
the Cocos Islands airfield facilities to support unrestricted P-8 and UAVoperations 
and exploring opportunities for enhanced cooperation with the US Navy at Stir-
ling are key recommendations and promises (Hawke and Smith 2012, iv; Com-
monwealth of Australia 2013, 10). With the Indo-Pacific now actively promoted 
as a single strategic arc central to Australia's defence, these enhanced military ties 
with the United States look natural and hardly need justification. 
Japan's interest in creating an Indo-Paci:fic arc follows a similar geopoliti-
cal logic. Emphasising its dependence on the 'security of maritime navigation 
from Africa and the Middle East to East Asia', Japan finds it necessary to engage 
closely with India, which shares similar interests (Ministry of Defense 2010, 9; 
see Jain and Harimoto in this volume). In 2007, while visiting India, Prime Minis-
ter Shinzo Abe (2007) proposed 'a dynamic coupling' of the Pacific and the Indian 
Oceans 'as seas of freedom and of prosperity'. In 2008, Japan and India signed 
the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, and in 2010, the two countries held 
their first senior-level dialogue on foreign affairs and security. 
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A fear of China's rising clout in Asian regionalism can largely account for 
Japan's overture to India and its enthusiasm about the Indo-Pacific concept. 
Before Shinzo Abe was elected prime minister for the second time in Decem-
ber 2012, he penned an essay, titled 'Asia's Democratic ~ecurity Diamond', 
outlining his continued interest and investment in Japan's expanded strategic 
horizons 'starting from the Indian Ocean Region to the Western Pacific' (Abe 
2012). In the short essay, he openly named the threat of China as the rationale 
for his strategic vision: 'Increasingly, the South China Sea seems set to become 
a "Lake Beijing" .... Soon, the PLA Navy's newly built aircraft carrier will 
be a common sight - more than sufficient to scare China's neighbors.' Takashi 
Terada (2010) argues that it was this China factor that led Japan's Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to advocate the EAS, an Asian regional concept that would 
allow Japan to redraw the geopolitical map of East Asia so as to include Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and India as additional count~rbalances against China. In 
this sense, the Indo-Pacific, or what Abe termed 'a broader Asia', is a continua-
iion of Japan's expanded EAS (ASEAN+6) regional initiative. A reason behind 
Abe's new proposal, as Terada (2010, 78) notes, was that the United States, an 
essential country to Asia's new regional architecture, was absent in the EAS at 
the time. 
India: looking and acting east 
-As the 'child of partition' with a deep sense of 'cartographic anxiety' (Krishna 
1996, 196; see also Chacko 2012a, 144-151), India has also been uneasy about its 
geopolitical milieu. In the late 1990s, the US military presence at Diego Garcia 
in the Indian Ocean caused alarm among certain Indian scholars and officials, but 
more often than not it is China that is considered India's arch-rival. According to a 
2013 Lowy Institute poll, 83% of Indians view China as a threat (Medcalf 2013a, 
15). The US-based analyst Mohan Malik (2006) describes a Chinese strategy of 
containing India and squeezing its traditional strategic space in the region. Indian 
analysts such as Gurpreet Khurana and C. Raja Mohan see an Indo-Pacific 'rivalry 
arc' between India and China. With India's sea lines of communications appar-
ently at the mercy of the Chinese, they call for projecting India's power into the 
Pacific to match China's growing presence in the Indian Ocean (Yoshihara and 
Holmes 2010, 15). 
To be sure, India's official positions on the Indo-Pacific are not as assertive. 
Also, since the beginning of its Look East policy, India's interest in the Indo-
Pacific formulation has much to do with geoeconomic considerations ( see Chacko 
in this volume). Nonetheless, given the mistrust between India and China after 
their brief but bloody border conflict in 1962, a strategic logic is not far below 
the surface. For example, the 2007 India~ Maritime Military Strategy defines the 
South China Sea as an area of strategic interest for India's deployment of future 
maritime forces (Scott 2013a, 53). Seizing on such common threads of apprehen-
sion about China within the American and Indian strategic communities, Secretary 
Clinton urged India, which still has a 'strategic autonomy' tradition, to 'not just 
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look east, but continue to engage and act east as well' (Quoted in Gupta 2012). As 
Mohan (2012, 97-100) has documented, since the 1990s India has expanded its 
joint naval exercises with all Southeast Asian countries and extended its military 
presence in the western Pacific through multilateral exercises with US, Japanese, 
Australian and Singaporean navies . After the election of N arendra Modi, India 
has become more active in strengthening regional security arrangements, such as 
with Australia and Japan, with whom it shares concerns about ' access and secu-
rity' (Modi 2014). Commentators wrote that 'burgeoning Indian-Japanese secu-
rity cooperation is one reason to believe that the Look East policy is genuinely 
now the Act East policy' (Cronin and Baruah 2014). 
Before I turn to China, a brief look at the four countries just discussed reveals 
that the Indo-Pacific is not just a purely realpolitik enterprise. It also has a dis-
tinctively neoconservative ring to it. These four democracies in the ludo-Pacific, 
perhaps more than by coincidence, were the old cast of an earlier Quadrilateral 
Strategic Dialogue (QSD) initiative pursued during the George W. Bush admin-
istration. The 'Quad', as it is known, was initiated by Abe, whose 2007 speech 
to the Indian Parliament appealed to the values of freedom and democracy as an 
organising principle of his broader Asia proposal. An experimental meeting of 
the Quad took place in May 2007, three months after Abe and US Vice President 
Dick Cheney discussed the idea of forming a quadrilateral grouping among like-
minded democracies (Terada 2010, 85). Drawing on the neoconservative foreign 
policy ideas of both military strength and moral clarity, the defunct Quad idea 
never went away. After attending the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue with her Amer-
ican and Japanese counterparts in October 2013, Australian Foreign Minister Julie 
Bishop (2013) left the door open for resurrecting the quadrilateral dialogue, as she 
promised to keep it in mind when looking to 'more deeply network our strategic 
defence and security alliances and partnerships in the region'. Strategic observ-
ers from influential American and Australian think tanks recently made a similar 
call for the 'return to the U .S.-Japan-Australia-India "Quad" concept' (Green and 
Shearer 2012, 184 ). As the United States, Japan, Australia and India regroup as 
the core 'diamond' members of the freshly minted Indo-Pacific, it may be argued 
that it has already been revived under a different guise, namely, through the exist-
ing US-Japan-Australia and US-Japan-India trilateral dialogues, and the newly 
created Japan-Australia-India trilateral dialogue. 
China: the new 'odd man out'? 
As the Indo-Pacific takes on a value-based quality, China now seems to emerge 
effectively as the new odd man out of Asia. While the formation of the Indo-
Pacific may have been premised on China as the geopolitical ( and ideological) 
Other in the region, this does not mean that China's role in this process is inno-
cent. It too has been part of the construction of the Indo-Pacific with its own 
version of cartographic anxiety and associated practices of security. But it is per-
haps equally true that China's contribution has been largely defensive and reactive 
(Li and Chan 2011, 54). 
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Although Beijing has long been wary about US hegemony, its main concern 
continues to be about internal stability and regime legitimacy. To that end, Bei-
jing's favourite mantra about its international strategic environment remains 
'peace and development' . Its eagerness to join the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), its enthusiasm for a free trade agreement with the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN), and more recently its Maritime Silk Road initiative 
(now part of the so-called One Belt, One Road strategy) demonstrated that its 
foreign policy has been driven more by agendas of domestic development and 
geoeconomics than by regional geopolitics. In any case, Beijing is well aware that 
regional geopolitical dynamism is fraught with obstacles of lingering sovereignty 
issues and popular nationalism (He 2004). Yet, by virtue of its rapid rise as an 
economic powerhouse, China has emerged as an indispensable force in regional 
economic and financial integration. In doing so, it seems to have begun 'knitting 
together the "spokes" of the US-centred hub-and-spoke security-alliance system' 
(Quoted in Terada 2010, 76), something directly at odds with the aforementioned 
·us geopolitical imperative of keeping the 'barbarians' apart. Although China's 
regional strategy is not simply power balancing (Breslin 2008, 136), its regional 
economic engagement has nevertheless been widely seen as a bid for regional 
pnmacy. r_. 
Geopolitical reasoning is a contagious state of mind. As foreign observers see 
China's rise in stark geopolitical terms, their Chinese counterparts also increas-
ingly look at China's security environment through a dark geopolitical lens. As 
Wang Jisi (2012a, 3) notes, although their country is now much stronger, 'some 
Chinese now feel a sense of greater insecurity, more anxiety, and deeper victim 
complex.' The 2013 Chinese defence white paper is not immune to this sense of 
insecurity (Information Office of the State Council 2013 ). 
Indeed, facing the US 's own well-established 'string of pearls' /'first island 
chain' strategies, China has found itself surrounded by what Yoshihara and Hol-
mes (2010, 284) call a 'Great Wall in reverse'. With 80 percent of its oil flows 
passing through the Strait of Malacca, Chinese leaders are allegedly deeply dis-
turbed by the 'Malacca Dilemma' (Li and Zhang 2010), made even more acute by 
their awareness that both ends of the Strait are controlled by US fleets . In response 
to these real or imagined geostrategic predicaments on China's Pacific coasts, 
some Chinese analysts tum their gaze to the Indian Ocean: 
With China's security in the Western Pacific region hamstrung by the US 
and Japan, the South China Sea issue has no short-term solution. The Indian 
Ocean thus is not only the main passage for China to break through the 
American military's Pacific island chain and tackle the 'Malacca Dilemma', 
but also the ideal option for China's seaward strategy as well as the testing 
ground for building a blue-water navy. 
(Lou and Zhang 2010, 43) 
In a Global Times article, Wang Jisi (2012b) urges China to develop a westward 
strategy as China's own geostrategic rebalancing to counter the US rebalance to 
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Asia. Indeed, in recent years Beijing has sought to court Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Myanmar and to build port facilities and listening posts in some 
of those countries. It has sent naval vessels on counter-piracy missions and port 
calls throughout the Indian Ocean region. Consequently, mirroring America's new 
two-ocean (Indo-Pacific) navy strategy and India's Look East policy, China has 
launched its own two-ocean navy strategy in the same waters (Wang 2005, 105; 
Kaplan 2010, 134; Li and Zhang 2010). 
China's two-ocean strategy culminated in the announcement of the Maritime 
Silk Road by Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2013 during his visit to 
Indonesia. Together with its land-based Silk Road Economic Belt andAIIB initia-
tives, China seeks to expand its trade routes, increase regional connectivity, and 
gain better access to natural resources as well as boosting its 'soft power' along 
those routes. In part, these initiatives, which are open to all interested countries in 
those regions, are also China's responses to anxieties among its neighbours about 
its growing influence. While some countries in the region welcome the initia-
tives, many remain sceptical of Beijing's strategic intentions (Chaturvedy 2014). 
The 2014 US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report argues 
that these represent 'China's increasingly strident efforts to intimidate and coerce 
many of its neighbors' (USCC 2014, 14 ). More ambivalent attitudes are found 
in India. Geethanjali Nataraj (2015) at the Observer Research Foundation urges 
India to accept China's invitation to be part of its Maritime Silk Road, but f onner 
Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal (2014) argues that this is China's 'string 
of pearls' strategy under a new guise, designed to unsettle India. Brahma Chel-
laney (2015), at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research, similarly con-
tends that China is seeking to 'challenge America's sway and chip away at India's 
natural-geographic advantage'. 
No doubt, geopolitical anxieties about China's rise will continue. Alongside the 
pivot to Asia strategy of the United States, India's Look East policy and China's 
Maritime Silk Road strategy have begun to 'stamp their authority on the same 
region'. As a result, their 'widening geopolitical horizons' (Scott 2008, 1, 19) 
increasingly overlap, thus giving some operational substance to the Indo-Pacific 
imaginary. Although China has not warmed to the Indo-Pacific concept, its Mari-
time Silk Road concept has been seen as 'analogous (or as a rival) to the Indo-
Pacific' (Jakobson and Medcalf 2015, 4). China's interests in the Indian Ocean 
and its geopolitical anxieties and policy responses are thus contributing to its 
emergence as a strategic centre of gravity of sorts. As many Chinese strategic 
planners now begin to 'look at China's grand strategy across a wide Indo-Pacific 
swath' (Zhao 2013), the new region may become still more real. 
Conclusion: what's in a name? 
In this chapter, I have argued that the Indo-Pacific was primarily conceived as 
a collective geopolitical construct with a neoconservative bent, but it is worth 
stressing that its arrival is not entirely a matter of geopolitical imaginations. It 
also has something to do with geoeconomics, global supply chains and increasing 
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economic interdependence. In fact, even the most enthusiastic geopolitical advo-
cates such as Kaplan (2010, 291) acknowledge that regional relations are not 
always about geopolitical manoeuvring. On that basis, many proponents of the 
Indo-Pacific deny that the new regional concept is about containing China. Med-
calf (2013b, 64), for example, insists that the Indo-Pacific is 'a· geo-economic 
reality ... not a strategic project to contain that rise'. Others point out that the US 
pivot to the Indo-Pacific is motivated by a range of issues such as energy supplies, 
failing states, climate change, piracy, terrorism, Iran, and drug trafficking, not just 
great power rivalry (Green and Shearer 2012, 176). 
Yet, despite such exceptions ~d denials, the geopolitical mindset has been cen-
tral to mainstream Indo-Pacific discourses. If anti-piracy, disaster relief and fight-
ing terrorism were the main purposes of the new regional design, then the reported 
plan to deploy giant unmanned patrol planes to Cocos Islands and aircraft carriers 
and nuclear-powered attack submarines near Perth. would not make much sense 
(Taylor 2012). Even when there was anti-piracy or disaster relief cooperation, 
- geopolitics seemed still at play, as exemplified by China's exclusion from both the 
2004 tsunami core group (from which the short-lived quadrilateral talks emerged) 
and the US-led Task Force 151, the main multilateral anti-piracy group (Green 
and Shearer 2012, 185). Such geopolitical pr~ces of security seem to lend cre-
dence to a senior US official's admission that 'China is a central element in our 
effort to encourage India's emergence as a world power' and that 'we don't need 
to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises' 
(Twining 2007, 83; see also Gilboy and Heginbotham 2013, 139). Given that the 
criteria or principles for regional cooperation often entail 'democratic values' and 
'a willingness to help shape and abide by rules and norms for a secure and stable 
region' (Medcalf 2013b, 66), it is not difficult to see which country is the main 
intended target for socialisation, and failing that, exclusion. The fact that such a 
geopolitical undertone is not always palpable may be due to 'the sensitive presen-
tation of initiatives with an emphasis on broader benefits to the region' (Berteau 
and Green 2012, 33). But in her appeal to Congress to maintain State Department 
funding, Secretary Clinton felt obliged to talk straight: 'We are in a competition 
for influence with China; let's put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of 
what we believe in, and let's just talk straight realpolitik' (Dombey 2011 ). 
This geopolitical, and to some degree neoconservative, construction of the 
Indo-Pacific should raise concerns about its long-term political implications. As 
this concept gains traction, we need to look more closely at its conflicting regional 
agendas and ask whose interests it serves (Eisley and Phillips 2012). For all its 
apparent inclusion of such low-politics do-good issues as climate change and anti-
piracy, this spatial imagination has been galvanised by the perceived rise of China 
and concurrent great power rivalries for regional hegemony. This geopolitical 
obsession not only obscures the extensive regional cooperation and transnational 
issues of human security such as poverty, hunger, public health, small arms and 
drug trafficking, environmental degradation, and natural disasters in the region 
(Bateman, Chan and Graham 2011, 8-9). It also plays on and exacerbates existing 
anxieties, mistrust and security dilemmas. When the United States turned down 
China anxieties in the 'Indo-Pacific' 109 
the request by the United Nations to include China in the joint tsunami disaster 
relief operations in December 2004, China allegedly hastened the 'rollout of its 
out-of-area "military missions other than war" activities' (Gupta 2012). And in 
response to China's military modernisation, alongside the pivot to Asia, a long 
article in the prestigious Journal of Strategic Studies (Mirski 2013), with a shorter 
version appearing in the influential National Interest magazine, now openly advo-
cates a US naval blockade against China, specifically targeting its oil imports. The 
likely tit-for-tat cycles of such fanciful but potentially self-fulfilling game plays 
do not bode well for the future regional order. 
It is in this context that it is imperative to critically examine the influential 
mindset of reading the regional dynamism from a purely geopolitical perspective, 
although this is not to deny that some degree of geopolitical rivalry is evident in 
the region. Insofar as all regions are 'social constructions created through politics' 
(Katzenstein 2002, 105) rather than predetermined by certain mysterious, irresist-
ible geographical forces, the Indo-Paci:fic can and should be made for the better 
through less geopolitically driven imaginations. In this sense, the term per se is 
not the issue. What is problematic is the ways in which it has been defined almost 
exclusively in geopolitical terms. 
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